Relationship established
A customer, supplier, research partner, investor, recruiter, conference organizer, visiting scholar, or prospective collaborator establishes a legitimate reason to engage.
Pattern model
A common sequence links otherwise different cases. It is a diagnostic model—not a claim that every Chinese partner, researcher, employee, or institution follows it.
The transfer chain
Controls are strongest when they cover the whole path. Stopping at cybersecurity misses recruitment, tacit know-how, commercial leverage, and lawful-but-damaging learning.
A customer, supplier, research partner, investor, recruiter, conference organizer, visiting scholar, or prospective collaborator establishes a legitimate reason to engage.
The relationship reaches people, laboratories, repositories, samples, prototypes, manufacturing floors, vendor lists, work devices, or the tacit knowledge that makes a process work.
Information is requested, copied, memorized, downloaded, photographed, exported, reverse engineered, or obtained through an insider. The conduct can range from contractual learning to criminal theft.
Files, samples, knowledge, equipment, or personnel move across organizational or national boundaries—sometimes through personal accounts, travel, outside companies, or affiliated institutions.
The recipient integrates the asset into research, manufacturing, products, bids, training, standards, or further collection. Attribution becomes harder as the knowledge diffuses.
The originator may face lost contracts, compressed development time for a competitor, price pressure, weakened strategic position, litigation cost, or damage that cannot be cleanly priced.
Signals worth combining
A conference invitation, a large download, a new outside company, or a departing engineer can each be benign. Risk emerges when context joins them: unusual access, undisclosed interests, escalating technical requests, travel, commercial conflict, and movement toward a competitor.