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Aerospace & defense / 2008–2017

A United Technologies engineer carried F-22 and F-35 engine documents to China for a state-run institute S1 S2

While seeking work at a state-run Chinese institute, Yu Long used sensitive United Technologies material to support his application, carried a drive of documents to China, and retained controlled military-engine records. S1 S2

Evidence at a glance How labels work

Evidence status Adjudicated
Case-level nexus context Court-established or admitted
Public sources 2 Automated checks verify citation linkage; editorial review judges support
Evidence foundation Official summaries only The adjudicated outcome is currently linked through official government summaries; no dispositive court document is yet included. S1 S2
Publication record Published Aug 23, 2026 Reviewed Aug 25, 2026 · Next Aug 23, 2027

Evidence status and PRC-state nexus answer different questions and must not be joined across different actors. Actor-specific outcomes appear below.

Compare this file
Finding

Long pleaded guilty to conspiring to steal trade secrets knowing the conduct would benefit a foreign government or instrumentality, plus an arms-export offense. He was sentenced to time served after roughly 30 months in custody. S1 S2

01 / Executive brief

Executive summary

Yu Long worked from 2008 through 2014 as a senior engineer and scientist at United Technologies Research Center, where his assignments included F119 and F135 engine programs used by the F-22 and F-35. While still employed, he sought positions with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Shenyang Institute of Automation, and other state-run institutions. S1 S2

Recruiters asked Long to substantiate his experience with work documents. He agreed, traveled to China carrying extensive UTRC material, and later possessed proprietary and export-controlled records on digital devices and in his baggage. He pleaded guilty to a trade-secret conspiracy with admitted foreign-government benefit and an Arms Export Control Act offense; the court imposed time served after approximately 30 months in custody. S1 S2

A Pratt and Whitney F135 military turbofan engine during development testing
technology

The F135 powers the F-35 and was among the military-engine programs in Long's United Technologies work. This is a public-domain program image, not evidence recovered in his case.

U.S. Air Force · Public domain ↗

02 / The vignette

What happened

A job application requested proof of protected work

The recruitment process collapsed the boundary between résumé evidence and employer property. After Long agreed in principle to join the Shenyang Institute of Automation, institute personnel asked him for documents and project examples supporting the claims in his application. The requested proof came from sensitive work he had performed for UTRC. S1

Military-engine files traveled with the engineer

Long took a drive containing UTRC documents to China and worked for the institute in 2014. On a later trip through Newark, investigators found a paper from a Rolls-Royce-led consortium in his baggage, while digital devices contained proprietary and export-controlled files connected to military engine development. S1 S2

The plea established the foreign-government element

Long did not merely admit unauthorized possession. He pleaded guilty to conspiring to steal trade secrets while knowing or intending that the conduct would benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent, as well as to exporting a defense article without a license. The resulting time-served sentence reflected about two and a half years already spent in custody. S1 S2

03 / Anatomy

How access became transfer

This six-part framework asks the same questions of every file. Each stage carries its own evidence state; a listed stage can be alleged, inferred, interrupted, disputed, or not established. The structure does not manufacture a completed transfer or harm.

  1. 01

    Relationship context Documented

    Senior defense researcher

    UTRC employed Long in assignments touching F119 and F135 military-engine programs. S1 S2

  2. 02

    Access assessed Documented

    Sensitive program files

    His work exposed him to proprietary and export-controlled engineering records. S1

  3. 03

    Acquisition assessed Adjudicated or admitted

    Documents collected for recruitment

    Long retained work files and project examples to support applications to Chinese institutions. S1 S2

  4. 04

    Movement assessed Documented

    Drive carried to China

    He traveled with extensive UTRC material and later possessed additional records in baggage and digital devices. S1 S2

  5. 05

    Downstream use assessed Adjudicated or admitted

    Employment credentials and research

    The material supported Long's recruitment and work with a state-run institute. S1

  6. 06

    Consequences assessed Adjudicated or admitted

    Plea after extended custody

    Long admitted trade-secret conspiracy and illegal export and was sentenced to time served after about 30 months. S1 S2

04 / Evidence boundary

What is established—and what is not

Established in the record

  • Long admitted stealing sensitive UTRC documents and transporting material to China while seeking work at state-run institutions. S1 S2
  • His plea established knowledge or intent that the conspiracy would benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent. S1

Uncertain, limited, or unresolved

  • The reviewed public record does not identify a specific PRC engine or weapon system into which the files were incorporated. S1 S2

Subject response / procedural context

  • Long admitted the offenses through a guilty plea. The reviewed sources do not include a separate public response from the Chinese Academy of Sciences or Shenyang Institute of Automation. S1 S2

05 / Sequence

Timeline

  1. UTRC employment begins

    Long began a senior engineering role with access to military-engine research. S1

  2. Institute requests work proof

    After an agreement in principle, recruiters asked Long for employer documents and project examples. S1

  3. Guilty plea

    Long admitted the trade-secret conspiracy and arms-export offense. S1

  4. Time-served sentence

    The court sentenced Long after approximately 30 months already spent in custody. S2

06 / People and institutions

Who appears in the public record

Yu Long

Former United Technologies senior engineer and scientist S1 S2

Outcome: Pleaded guilty; sentenced to time served S1 S2

Actor-specific PRC nexus Court-established or admitted

Yu Long: Long admitted the foreign-government or foreign-instrumentality benefit element; the receiving institutions were state-run Chinese research bodies. S1 S2

Shenyang Institute of Automation

State-run institute that recruited Long and requested supporting work material S1 S2

Actor-specific PRC nexus Documented affiliation or support

The institute is a state-run body identified in the admitted beneficiary relationship; Long's plea does not assign criminal liability to the institute. S1 S2

Chinese Academy of Sciences

State-run institution affiliated with the recruiting institute S1 S2

Actor-specific PRC nexus Documented affiliation or support

The Chinese Academy of Sciences is the state-run institution affiliated with the recruiting institute; Long's plea does not assign it criminal liability. S1 S2

Originator / affected institution

United Technologies Research Center

Employer and source of the protected engineering records S1 S2

Originator / affected institution

Pratt & Whitney and program partners

Developers of military-engine technology reflected in the records S1 S2

07 / Consequences

Documented, attributed, potential, and unknown consequences

Documented record

The files exposed proprietary and export-controlled military-engine work; the reviewed sources do not provide a court-adopted monetary loss. S1 S2

08 / Hindsight analysis

Where leadership could have seen risk

These are our analytic judgments based on the public record, not court findings. They are framed to improve controls without treating nationality as a risk factor.

Recruiting demanded employer proof

A foreign hiring process rewarded submission of protected work samples instead of relying on sanitized descriptions and references.

Travel carried digital and paper records

The risk crossed devices, external drives, and baggage, making a single-channel control insufficient.

09 / Apply the lesson

Actions leaders can take

  1. companies

    Sanitize work samples

    Provide approved portfolios or employment verification so staff never need protected documents to prove technical experience.

  2. both

    Review sensitive foreign recruitment

    Require prompt disclosure when a foreign institution requests project files, code, drawings, or sponsor-only results during hiring.

  3. companies

    Unify export and insider signals

    Correlate travel, device activity, print events, and export-control classifications around high-risk career transitions.

10 / Source record

Sources

Links point to the public record reviewed for this file. Government releases can summarize court proceedings but remain government-authored sources; the source note identifies those limits.

  1. S1

    Chinese National Admits Stealing Sensitive Military Program Documents from United Technologies ↗

    U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Connecticut · Published Dec 19, 2016 · Retrieved Aug 23, 2026

    official summary government release
  2. S2

    Export and Sanctions Enforcement Cases: Yu Long Case Summary ↗

    U.S. Department of Justice, National Security Division · Published May 26, 2017 · Retrieved Aug 23, 2026

    official summary government release

12 / Reference

Cite this dossier

Use the permanent URL and review date below so readers can identify the version of the public-source record you consulted.

ChinaSteals. “A United Technologies engineer carried F-22 and F-35 engine documents to China for a state-run institute.” CS-021. Published Aug 23, 2026; last reviewed Aug 25, 2026. https://chinasteals.com/cases/yu-long-united-technologies-engines/

Permanent dossier URL →